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Military matters
Beyond Prague 
Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and 
Anthony Forster examine military reform in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the 
capabilities of potential NATO members 
 
By the middle of the decade NATO and the 
European Union may have up to ten new 
members from Central and Eastern Europe. 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia are widely thought likely 
to be invited to join NATO at the Prague 
Summit. Together with the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, which joined NATO in 
1999, these are also the countries from the 
region currently negotiating for membership of 
the European Union. The addition of ten new 
members from Central and Eastern Europe will 
add an important new dimension to the 
ongoing debate on defence capabilities and burden-sharing within NATO, as well as to the European 
Union's emerging European Security and Defence Policy. However, an issue that has not yet been 
adequately addressed is what the new members can and should contribute to NATO and the 
European Union militarily, and how their national defence reform programmes relate to wider 
collective NATO and EU defence-modernisation efforts. 
 
If all these states are invited to join NATO at the forthcoming Prague Summit, the Alliance's total 
population will have increased from 735 million to 839 million since 1999 - an expansion of 104 million 
or roughly 14 per cent (see table with data from 2000, the most recent year for which detailed 
comparative information is available). NATO's active armed forces will have increased by a similar 
proportion, from 3,448,590 to 3,986,045 — an expansion of about 16 per cent. Reserve forces, 
however, will have grown substantially in size, with the Central and Eastern European states bringing 
an additional 1,714,700 reserves to the "old" NATO's 3,774,000 - an increase of about 45 per cent. In 
contrast, the annual gross domestic product (GDP) of the Central and Eastern European states was 
only $372 billion in 2000, compared to $18,074 billion for the longer-standing NATO members - an 
increase of only 2 per cent in the Alliance's total GDP. 
 
Figures for defence spending are similar. In 2000, the old NATO members spent $460 billion on 
defence, whereas the Central and Eastern European states spent $7 billion. Their accession to NATO 
will therefore result in a defence spending increase of only 1.5 per cent for the Alliance as a whole. 
These numbers illustrate a sharp reality. Although the total armed forces of NATO's member states 
will increase significantly as a result of enlargement, the new members are relatively poor when 
compared to the old members and the real resources they can commit to defence are much more 
limited. 
 
National comparisons 
 
National comparisons illustrate this point. Spain has a 
population of nearly 40 million people, with a GDP of 
$568 billion. By devoting 1.27 per cent of GDP to the 
military it is able to generate a defence budget of $7.2 
billion that is used to support an active armed forces 
strength of 143,450. Poland has a similar population 
(nearly 39 million people), but has a significantly smaller 
annual GDP of $160 billion. Despite devoting a much 
higher proportion (2.06 per cent) of GDP to defence, at 
$3.3 billion its defence budget is less than half that of 
Spain's. In addition, it supports larger armed forces with 
an active strength of 206,045. Similarly, the Netherlands 
has a population of nearly 16 million people and a GDP 
of $347 billion. Allocating 1.87 per cent of GDP to 
defence, it has a defence budget of $6.5 billion, 
supporting active armed forces of 50,430. In contrast, 
Romania, with a population of more than 22 million 
people has a GDP of only $38.4 billion. Despite directing 
2.45 per cent of GDP to defence, it has a defence 
budget of just under $1 billion, supporting active armed 
forces of 103,000. 
 
Another way of comparing new and old NATO members is in terms of their contributions to 
international peace-support operations, including the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,* but also other UN-led or 
mandated missions. In 2000, the old NATO members contributed 63,293 troops to peace-support 
operations, while the Central and Eastern European states provided 4,294 personnel. The new 
member states would therefore contribute an additional 7 per cent to the peacekeeping forces 
deployed by NATO members - a significant contribution, but also less than their proportion of the 
enlarged Alliance's total population. Again, national comparisons highlight the point. Belgium with a 
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population of 10 million contributes nearly 1,500 troops to peace-support operations. The Czech 
Republic with a similar population contributes just under 700 soldiers. Latvia, with a population of 2.3 
million contributes just over 100 troops to peace-support operations; whereas Norway with a 
population of 4.5 million provides more than 1,100 soldiers to peace-support operations. 
 
Central and Eastern European states have faced major defence reform challenges since the early 
1990s. Following the collapse of Communism, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia inherited Soviet-model armed forces structured for Warsaw Pact operations. It 
was generally recognised that these countries' armed forces were too large for the new international 
situation and high defence spending imposed too great a burden on their struggling economies. 
 
In the early-to-mid 1990s, major cuts in defence spending were introduced which broadly reduced 
defence spending by half compared to the Cold War high of the late 1980s. In addition, the size of the 
armed forces was reduced significantly, forces were re-orientated away from their Warsaw Pact roles, 
most procurement was abandoned and training levels were reduced. The newly independent Baltic 
states and Slovenia faced the different challenge of building national armed forces from scratch 
(although in the Slovene case this occurred on the basis of territorial defence forces that had been 
created while the country was part of the former Yugoslavia). For these states, the initial focus was on 
developing lightly armed territorial defence forces. 
 
Defence reform 
 
Since the mid-1990s the Central and Eastern European states have - with NATO's support and 
encouragement - instituted further defence reforms. These have generally focused on further 
reductions in the overall size of armed forces and the development of forces capable of contributing to 
peace-support operations. The decline in defence spending bottomed out in the mid-1990s. Since 
then most of the Central and Eastern European states have introduced small increases in their 
defence budgets. The prospect of NATO membership has played a central role in generating political 
pressure for further defence reforms, contributions to NATO-led operations in the Balkans and 
increases in defence spending. Moreover, NATO's Partnership for Peace programme, its Planning 
and Review Process and the Membership Action Plan have provided an institutional framework for 
thinking through defence reform issues. As the table shows, the Central and Eastern European states 
now spend an average of 1.81 per cent of their GDP on defence - less than the old NATO average of 
2.12 per cent but broadly comparable with the EU average of 1.85 per cent. 
 
These developments have had a number of impacts. Most positively, the Central and Eastern 
European states have increased their contributions to international peace-support operations, in 
particular the NATO-led operations in the Balkans. Central and Eastern European forces that have 
participated in these operations have generally performed well and have gradually taken on more 
demanding roles. Participation in these operations has contributed to the professionalisation of the 
participating units. It may also have a positive trickle-down effect on the countries' armed forces more 
broadly, as soldiers are rotated into and out of the operations. 
 
However, some critics have argued that 
the Central and Eastern European states 
are increasingly developing "two-tier" 
militaries, divided between elite cadres 
capable of operating alongside NATO 
Allies and the conscript-based bulk of the armed forces whose operational effectiveness is degrading. 
Indeed, reductions in defence budgets and the prioritisation of elite forces has often resulted in 
significant reductions in spending on maintenance, operations and training for the majority of the 
armed forces. For example, in 2000, Romanian Chief-of-Staff General Mihail Popescu acknowledged 
that 70 per cent of Romania's air force pilots were not operational due to insufficient flying time. 
Similarly, due largely to budgetary constraints, Hungarian pilots fly an average of between 50 and 75 
hours a year. In comparison, the US Air Force considers 100 hours flying time a year a dangerously 
low amount. In the Hungarian case, this situation appears likely to continue for the foreseeable future, 
except in the case of 30 Mig-29 pilots who will be assigned to NATO missions. 
 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe face continuing and serious problems in relation to 
defence reform. When they join NATO, their national defence dilemmas will increasingly become part 
of the wider defence capabilities and burden-sharing questions facing the Alliance as a whole. The 
relative poverty of the Central and Eastern European states and the many other social and economic 
problems they face mean that, even with increases in defence budgets, the resources available for 
their armed forces will remain limited. While there is broad political support for the United States' war 
on terrorism, the absence of direct and immediate threats to the Central and Eastern European states 
suggests that more dramatic increases in defence spending are unlikely in future. Central and Eastern 
European governments face the difficult task of reconciling their limited resources available for 
defence with their commitment to participate in international peace-support operations, the declining 
operational effectiveness of the bulk of the armed forces and postponed procurement decisions. 
 
Defence reviews 
 
Since joining NATO, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have all undertaken new and important 
defence reviews. In each case, these recommended modest increases in defence spending alongside 
further downsizing of the armed forces and a move towards the establishment of largely volunteer, 
rather than conscript-based, forces. This points to one approach to defence reform: downsizing armed 
forces (both active and reserve) to free up resources to improve the capabilities and operational 
effectiveness of the remainder. How far this approach enables the Central and Eastern European 
states to resolve their defence dilemmas remains to be seen. More radical steps may be necessary to 
generate the resources required for a more wholesale modernisation of armed forces. 
 
In an environment where ground invasion threats appear unlikely, it may make sense for Central and 
Eastern European states to place more equipment, such as tanks and armoured personnel carriers, 
into long-term storage and disband the associated units rather than attempt to maintain such forces at 
low levels of readiness. Moreover, all the Central and Eastern European states still have large reserve 
forces compared to the old NATO members. With conscription periods being reduced in duration 
(often to less than a year), conscientious objection and draft-dodging levels high and refresher call-up 
periods reduced in both frequency and length, the military effectiveness of these reserves must also 
Central and Eastern European states 
have faced major defence reform 
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be open to question. As a result, this too might be an area where savings can sensibly be made. 
 
On the assumption of a warning time of some years before any possible ground invasion threat, this 
strategy would imply a much longer-term concept of mobilisation that would rely on the ability to bring 
equipment out of storage and train new forces, rather than simply mobilise pre-existing reserves. 
 
The Central and Eastern European states also face major procurement decisions. Having inherited 
Soviet-era equipment and postponed major defence purchases in the 1990s, this issue is now 
pressing. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are all engaged in controversial debates about 
whether to procure new fighter aircraft, which aircraft to buy and in what numbers. Even if undertaken 
with Western support and subsidies, the purchase of major equipment such as fighter aircraft and 
attack helicopters is likely to swallow up a large proportion of Central and Eastern European defence 
budgets. In 1999, for example, Romania cancelled its decision to procure US Bell 96 Cobra AH-1 
attack helicopters after widespread criticism that the purchase was a largely symbolic gesture that 
could not be properly utilised or supported in the confines of the country's defence budget. And the 
Czech Republic has been forced to put off and possibly abandon plans to purchase 24 Gripen fighters 
as a result of the cost of this summer's floods in Central Europe. Moreover, the relatively small size of 
the Central and Eastern European states means that they are likely individually to procure only small 
numbers of expensive assets such as fighters, while duplicating much of the support infrastructure 
necessary for their maintenance. 
 
Debate 
 
There is a need for a more thorough debate on such procurement issues. For many of the Central and 
Eastern European states, it may well make more sense to allocate resources to ground-based air 
defences, airspace monitoring systems and developing base infrastructure for the forward deployment 
of aircraft from larger Allies. An alternative approach might involve the development of a few 
genuinely multinational squadrons of fighter aircraft - perhaps linking Eastern and Western European 
states, and even possibly including non-NATO members such as Sweden - designated to provide air 
defence for all participating states. This would reduce the duplication and costs involved in 
maintaining separate national forces, while giving military substance to the political principle of 
collective security. The successful development of a Danish-German-Polish corps illustrates the way 
in which joint forces can act as force multipliers and give substance to the NATO security guarantee. 
 
Another related option is role specialisation, with states choosing to direct resources to areas where 
they have particular strengths while abandoning the attempt to maintain some other capabilities. The 
Czech armed forces, for example, have expertise in the area of nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons defence. If this approach is adopted (even in part), more should be done to consider 
collectively at the NATO and EU level what specialist capabilities are needed, which states might 
contribute to these and how other states could then direct their resources elsewhere. 
 
Moving further down the road of joint procurement, multinational forces and role specialisation may be 
difficult, however. Such ideas run counter to the understandable principle of maintaining the widest 
possible range of national defence capabilities as insurance against worst-case contingencies. They 
also confront the contentious problem of allocating the economic benefits associated with the 
production of equipment and maintenance of forces - as disputes among the various partners to 
Western European projects such as the Eurofighter illustrate. In the context of the ongoing debate 
about defence capabilities, these are problems for NATO and the European Union as a whole. 
Nevertheless, given their limited defence resources, the case for the Central and Eastern European 
states to follow this path is compelling. 
 
Progress 
 
Despite these difficulties, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have made significant progress 
in reforming their armed forces since the early 1990s. They have put in place mechanisms for 
democratic, civilian control of the armed forces and are now active contributors to international peace-
support operations in the Balkans and beyond. In the space of a decade, the Baltic republics have 
gone from states with no armed forces to participants in the NATO-led missions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo. Various countries from the region are already making, or have the potential 
to make, important specialist military contributions in niche areas such as nuclear, biological and 
chemical defence or de-mining. 
 
Nevertheless, the Central and Eastern European countries also face serious problems in the defence 
field. The development of elite cadres capable of operating alongside NATO Allies has to some extent 
camouflaged the declining operational effectiveness of the larger part of these countries' armed 
forces. Air forces whose pilots fly too few hours to be ready for combat environments and ground 
forces whose equipment does not function adequately are of little use to either the Central and 
Eastern European states themselves or NATO as a whole. The relative poverty of these countries 
means that, even with modest increases in defence spending, they will not be able greatly to increase 
real defence expenditures. 
 
Central and Eastern European governments and NATO as a whole need to acknowledge this reality 
and collectively explore possible ways forward. Solutions may involve more radical reductions in 
overall forces, the abandonment of some high prestige but expensive procurement plans, the 
development of more multinational forces and procurement projects, greater national role 
specialisation within NATO and the European Union, and the direction of more attention to the less 
glamorous aspects of defence policy such as training, operations and maintenance, and 
communications equipment. This will involve addressing difficult and sensitive issues, both nationally 
and collectively within NATO and the European Union. Without taking these steps, the Central and 
Eastern European military contribution to NATO and the European Union will be less than it could or 
should be, and the benefits of enlargement will not be fully reaped. 
 
Andrew Cottey is a lecturer at University College, Cork, Ireland. Timothy Edmunds and Anthony 
Forster are research fellow and research director respectively at the Defence Studies Department, 
King's College, London, based at the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College. 
  This article draws on a research project funded by the Economic and Social Research 
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Council One Europe or Several?. Further information can be found at the Civil-Military 
Relations in Central and Eastern Europe Internet Resource Centre (http://civil-
military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk). 
...top...
* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name. 
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